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THE BARKING DOG
Suzanna Sherry*
Professor Tushnet, and indeed many of the participants in this
symposium, seem to believe that United States v. Lopez' will have
some lasting significance. Those participants who disagree have
suggested that the case's lack of significance will stem from inade-
quacies of the test set out by the Court: it is easily evaded by
Congress, or it does not vary much from prior cases, or it applies
only in narrow circumstances. I agree that Lopez will have little
significance, but its minimal impact has little to do with the specif-
ics of the test. Instead, I believe that Lopez will join a growing list
of cases that have been a nine-days wonder: cases that appear to
be startling changes in direction and therefore create great joy and
great consternation when first decided, but that are subsequently
ignored by the Court. In one of these cases, the Supreme Court
was described as having created "islands in [the] stream,"2 and
Lopez fits this description admirably.
All the cases on this list share two characteristics with Lopez.
First, they lie in a doctrinal area in which the Court has consistent-
ly warned that some particular power has constitutional limits, but
has never found any limits. This circumstance makes the Court
look like a dog whose bark is worse than its bite. Thus, in order
for the Court's warnings to be taken seriously, it has to bite some-
one occasionally-and it does not much matter whom. The second
aspect of these cases, however, creates a bit of a problem for the
Court when it decides to bite: following the precedent in the
(somewhat randomly) chosen case in which it "bites" would lead to
unpalatable consequences. In order to solve this dilemma, the Court
decides a case in a way that should, in theory, have great effect,
but then proceeds to ignore it in later cases. In these brief com-
* Earl R. Larson Professor of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law, University of
Minnesota.
1. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
2. LAwRENcE H. TRIE, AMEmcAN CONSTITTmONAL LAW 388 (2d ed. 1988).
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ments, I will give some examples of these unheeded cases, and
then explain why I think Lopez will eventually fall into the same
category.
The first example has been mentioned by a number of partici-
pants in this symposium: National League of Cities v. Usery? This
case, like Lopez, involved the limits of congressional Commerce
Clause power, and it is the case that earned the original "island in
the stream" designation. The Court had been warning Congress for
some time that its power under the Commerce Clause was not un-
limited, but it had not invalidated a congressional exercise of such
power since 1937. In National League of Cities, then, the Court
played "pick a statute, any statute," and demonstrated the sound-
ness of its prior warnings by invalidating portions of the Fair La-
bor Standards Act.4 The case was then essentially ignored for nine
years--during which time the Court unconvincingly attempted to
distinguish indistinguishable statutes 5-and was finally overruled.6
Had the Court actually followed National League of Cities, a large
number of federal statutes would have been invalidated.
The second example of an "island in the stream" case is
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co..
7
Since 1962, when the Court decided that Article I, or legislative,
courts could exercise some but presumably not all of the power
allocated to the judiciary by Article III of the Constitution,' the
Court had upheld every allocation of jurisdiction to Article I
courts.9 Nevertheless, the Court continued to maintain that the
3. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
4. Id. at 852 (holding that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority by "directly
displac[ing] the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions").
5. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236-42 (1983) (distinguishing the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967); Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mis-
sissippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761-70 (1982) (distinguishing the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act of 1978); United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 683-87 (1982)
(distinguishing the Railway Labor Act), overruled in part by Garcia v. San Antonio Met-
ro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 286-88 (1981) (distinguishing the Surface Mining Control Act of
1977).
6. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985).
7. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
8. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1962).
9. See, e.g., Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 390 (1973) (holding that "under
its Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, power to legislate for the District of Columbia, Congress may
provide for trying local criminal cases before judges who ... are not accorded [an Art.
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jurisdiction of Article I courts was not unlimited. In Northern
Pipeline, the Court played "pick a legislative court, any legislative
court," and invalidated the allocation of Article ImI jurisdiction to
bankruptcy courts, thus proving that there were indeed limits to the
jurisdiction of Article I courts) ° Although Northern Pipeline has
not yet been overruled, it has been ignored."
The most egregious example of the Court's inadequate at-
tempts to distinguish Northern Pipeline in subsequent cases came
only three years later, in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural
Products Co..' In his plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline, Jus-
tice Brennan held that the allocation of Article III jurisdiction to
Article I courts was valid in only three limited circumstances:
military courts, territorial courts, and courts exercising jurisdiction
in cases involving "public rights."'3 Justice Brennan did not define
"public rights," but noted that "the presence of the United States as
a proper party to the proceeding is a necessary but not sufficient
means of distinguishing 'private rights' from 'public rights."" 4 In
Union Carbide, Justice Brennan concurred in upholding an alloca-
tion of jurisdiction to a legislative court, despite the fact that the
suit was between two private parties.' He distinguished Northern
Pipeline by characterizing the issue as a "public right" and conve-
niently avoided his earlier description of public rights with a well-
placed ellipsis: "The opinion made clear that 'the presence of the
United States as a proper party to the proceeding is ...not [a]
sufficient means of distinguishing 'private rights' from 'public
rights.""' 6 A year later in Commodity Futures Trading Commission
v. Schor, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion upholding a legis-
lative court cited Justice White's dissent in Northern Pipeline near-
IIn judge's] life tenure and protection against reduction in salary").
10. 458 U.S. at 87.
11. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850-58
(1986) (upholding the jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission over
state law counterclaims to Commodity Exchange Act violations); Thomas v. Union Car-
bide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584-86 (1985) (upholding the use of binding arbi-
tration by the EPA to resolve disputes between participants in its pesticide registration
program).
12. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
13. 458 U.S. at 71.
14. Id. at 69 n.23.
15. 473 U.S. at 594 (Brennan, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 599 (Brennan, J., concurring) (alteration in original).
17. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
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ly as much as it cited either the plurality or concurring opinions.'
Had the Court actually followed Northern Pipeline, it is probable
that much of the jurisdiction given to administrative agencies
would have been held unconstitutional.
The final example of an apparently significant but later ig-
nored case is Bowsher v. Synar."9 Again, the Court had never
lived up to its warnings that the separation of powers doctrine
placed some limits on Congress's creativity. In Bowsher, the Court
played "pick a delegation, any delegation,"'  and struck down the
delegation of power to the Comptroller General. As with Northern
Pipeline, following that case might have led to the invalidation of
many administrative agency schemes as unconstitutional delega-
tions. Instead, the Court ignored its own precedent, upholding
similar delegations and intermingling of powers in two later cas-
es.
2 1
In light of this history, an amusing new parlor game for law
professors might be to predict the next occasion on which the
Court will "bite." When will it next depart from precedent in order
to fulfill earlier warnings? I will start the game by suggesting an
unusual twist on the practice, which would result in a surprising
holding of constitutionality. The Court has recently insisted that
strict scrutiny of affirmative action is not "strict in theory, but fatal
in fact,"'  and, while intimating that some redistricting schemes
designed to increase the voting power of minorities might be con-
stitutional,23 it has simultaneously invalidated every affirmative
action program and redistricting scheme. In order to stay true to its
assurances that affirmative action schemes can be constitutionally
designed, it will have to uphold one sooner or later. It might be a
18. Id. at 847-59.
19. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
20. Although the majority opinion did not specifically rely on the non-delegation doc-
trine, the case can be analyzed that way. See Jonathan L. Entin, The Removal Power and
the Federal Deficit: Form, Substance, and Administrative Independence, 75 KY. L.J. 699,
781-90 (1986-87).
21. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 411-12 (1989) (distinguishing
Bowsher based on the fact that, while the executive branch in this case has removal
power over a member of the judicial branch, the judicial branch member in question had
a nonjudicatory commission, hence judicial power was not infringed); Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 686 (1988) (distinguishing Bowsher based on Congress's placement of the
power to remove an independent counsel solely in the control of the executive branch).
22. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995) (citing Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)).
23. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2828-31 (1993).
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redistricting scheme (there are several on the Court's current dock-
et) or it might be an affirmative action program (there are several
working their way up through the courts). Either way, I predict
that although the media will make much of the case, it will soon
be forgotten as the Court returns to a scrutiny that is indeed strict
in theory but fatal in fact.
It is easy to conclude with hindsight that National League of
Cities, Northern Pipeline, and Bowsher were "islands in the
stream." The more difficult question is whether Lopez will fall into
that category. I have two reasons for believing that it will. First,
the Supreme Court has already signalled that it is uninterested in
aggressively following Lopez. Second, lower court applications of
Lopez illustrate just how radical a change it would work on consti-
tutional doctrine, suggesting that as with the earlier cases the impli-
cations of Lopez would be unpalatable.
In two cases and two denials of certiorari since Lopez, the
Court has passed up an opportunity to continue the Lopez revolu-
tion. Less than a month after Lopez, the Court upheld a RICO
conviction as consistent with the Commerce Clause.24 Although
the case involved an enterprise actually engaged in interstate com-
merce, and was thus distinguishable from Lopez, the Court engaged
in some peripheral discussion of Congress's power to regulate
activities with a substantial effect on interstate commerce' It is
significant that in the course of that discussion, the Court cited not
Lopez but Wickard v. Filburn,2 6 perhaps the broadest interpretation
of the Commerce Clause to date. Later in the term, the Court de-
cided Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon,' in which it upheld the Secretary of the Interior's broad
construction of the Endangered Species Act. Although that interpre-
tation prohibited private property owners from destroying wildlife
habitats on their property-which seems to be an activity only
speculatively related to interstate commerce-there was not a word
about Lopez in the case (including Justice Scalia's dissent). In
general, however, Justices Scalia and Thomas do seem more inter-
ested than the rest of the Court in aggressively pursuing Lopez.
Justice Scalia dissented from a denial of certiorari in United States
24. United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732, 1733 (1995).
25. Id.
26. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
27. 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2418 (1995)
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v. Ramey," in which a lower court had upheld the application of
the federal arson statute to the arson of a residence whose only
connection to interstate commerce was its utility connection; Justice
Scalia would have reversed and remanded for reconsideration in
light of Lopez." Justice Thomas dissented from a denial of certio-
rari in Cargill, Inc. v. United States," in which a lower court up-
held the application of a federal wetlands statute to private property
that sometimes provided a temporary resting place for migratory
birds; Justice Thomas would have granted certiorari to decide
whether the presence of these "airborne interstate travelers"' was
a sufficiently substantial connection to interstate commerce.
It should not be surprising that the Court is unwilling to fol-
low where Lopez leads. Some lower courts have been willing to do
so, and the results are spectacular. Three different federal district
courts have held that Lopez necessitates invalidating portions of the
Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 (the federal "deadbeat dads"
statute).32 Two district courts have relied on the reasoning of
Lopez to invalidate the federal Free Access to Clinic Entrances
Act.33 The Ninth Circuit struck down the application of the feder-
al arson statute to a private residence with the previously sufficient
utility connection, effectively following Justice Scalia's suggestion
in Ramey.34
Finally, Lopez could have an unanticipated effect in a relative-
ly obscure area. The Court has just decided that, at least for the
purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, the Indian Commerce Clause
is identical in scope to the interstate Commerce Clause,35 opening
up a whole new field in which to apply the limitations of Lopez.
Following Lopez, then, might invalidate or at least endanger a
great deal of important federal legislation. I doubt that the Supreme
28. 115 S. Ct. 1838 (1995), denying cert. to 24 F.3d 602 (4th Cir. 1994).
29. Id.
30. 116 S. Ct. 407, 407 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 409.
32. See United States v. Parker, 1995 WL 683215, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 1995);
United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727, 730 (W.D. Tex. 1995); United States v.
Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360, 1363 (D. Ariz. 1995); United States v. Schroeder, 894 F.
Supp. 360, 364 (D. Ariz. 1995).
33. See Hoffman v. Hunt, 1996 WL 192934, at *17 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 17, 1996); United
States v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621, 634 (E.D. Wis.) (relying on the Fifth Circuit's hold-
ing in Lopez), rev'd, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995).
34. See United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 528 (9th Cir. 1995).
35. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, No. 94-12, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 2165, at *30
(March 27, 1996).
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Court is willing to follow that course. Thus, Lopez, like its three
predecessors mentioned in this essay, is probably not a "constitu-
tional moment." Indeed, it is more of a torts moment: it is the
Court's one free bite before it resumes barking.

